Any substantive changes in this Library of Parliament Legislative Summary that have been made since the preceding issue are indicated in bold print.
Bill C‑22, An Act to amend the Criminal Code and the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act,1 was introduced in the House of Commons on 18 February 2021 by Minister of Justice David Lametti.
Bill C‑22:
Mandatory minimum sentences of imprisonment are legal requirements set out in criminal statutes that specify the minimum term of imprisonment for an offender convicted of an offence. Ordinarily, judges have broad discretion to determine an appropriate sentence for an offence; they are guided by the sentencing principles contained in the Code and give consideration to aggravating or mitigating factors and the circumstances of the particular offender.5 Mandatory minimum sentences of imprisonment limit judicial discretion by requiring a sentence of imprisonment of an particular length, regardless of these factors.
Mandatory minimum sentences have attracted some controversy and have been the subject of constitutional challenges in Canada. Proponents argue that mandatory minimum sentences allow for predictability in sentencing. They argue they can reduce disparities in sentencing by promoting similar terms for all offenders, and they can act as deterrents to criminal offending by enabling citizens to more accurately gauge the range of penalties they face if they commit an offence.6 Opponents argue that they unjustly limit judicial discretion, have little or no deterrent effect, and can result in disproportionate sentencing and over‑incarceration, and the disproportionate imprisonment of marginalized populations.7
Bill C‑22 removes mandatory minimum sentences for 14 offences in the Code and all offences in the CDSA. The offences in the Code for which mandatory minimum sentences are removed predominantly relate to firearms or other weapons.
A 2017 analysis by Statistics Canada showed that mandatory minimum sentences of imprisonment for specific firearms offences resulted in “a notable increase in the length of custody sentences”8 after longer mandatory minimum sentences were introduced, suggesting that mandatory minimum sentences do, in fact, have an impact on sentence length and can result in longer terms of imprisonment.
When sentencing a person convicted of an offence, judges are required by the Code to ensure that the sentence imposed is “proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender.”9 Chief Justice Beverley McLachlin, writing for the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada, expressed in R. v. Lloyd, that:
mandatory minimum sentences for offences that can be committed in many ways and under many different circumstances by a wide range of people are constitutionally vulnerable because they will almost inevitably catch situations where the prescribed mandatory minimum would require an unconstitutional sentence.10
This vulnerability to constitutional challenge is confirmed by data from the Department of Justice indicating that at least 262 constitutional challenges of mandatory minimum sentences have been brought in Canada. This type of challenge accounts for nearly 47% of all constitutional challenges to the Code that are being tracked by the Department.11 Furthermore, the Department of Justice reports that among these challenges tracked in the last decade, 69% of challenges to drug offences and 49% of challenges to firearms offences were successful. When a section of the Code is held to violate the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms12 (the Charter), that section can be declared of no force and effect.13 This means that the unconstitutional provision, to the extent of its inconsistency with the Charter, is no longer considered applicable law in the jurisdiction in which it was so declared. When such a declaration of invalidity is made by the Supreme Court of Canada, the unconstitutional provision is of no force and effect throughout Canada. Where an appellate court in a province makes such a declaration, the unconstitutional provision is of no force and effect in that province; however, it may continue to be applied in other provinces, making the application of the law inconsistent across the country.
In several cases, provisions imposing mandatory minimum sentences of imprisonment have been held to violate section 12 of the Charter, which guarantees that “[e]veryone has the right not to be subjected to any cruel and unusual treatment or punishment.”14 Where a mandatory minimum sentence provision would require a judge to impose a sentence that is “grossly disproportionate”15 to the gravity of the offence, the blameworthiness of the offender and the harm caused by the commission of the offence, that sentence may be held to violate section 12 of the Charter.16 Some of the mandatory minimum sentences of imprisonment repealed by Bill C‑22 have previously been held to be unconstitutional and struck down by Canadian courts, including appellate courts.17 Other mandatory minimum sentences of imprisonment have been upheld following constitutional challenges.18
Concerns have been raised by some academics and civil society organizations that mandatory minimum sentences of imprisonment can have a disproportionate impact on Indigenous and racialized persons and may contribute to the over‑incarceration of these populations.19
One reason cited by the Department of Justice for removing mandatory minimum sentences through Bill C‑22 is to “ensure courts can continue to impose tough sentences on violent and serious crimes without the disproportionate impact on Indigenous peoples, as well as Black Canadians and members of marginalized communities.”20
According to data from Correctional Service Canada, over a 10‑year period from 2007–2008 to 2016–2017, Black and other racialized offenders were disproportionately admitted into correctional facilities after receiving a mandatory minimum sentence of imprisonment. In 2016–2017, 40% of Black offenders admitted into custody had received a mandatory minimum sentence of imprisonment. The proportion of Indigenous offenders admitted into a correctional facility for an offence that is subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of imprisonment increased over the same 10‑year period from 14% to 26%, whereas the proportions of Black offenders and offenders from other racialized groups remained stable over this period. During this time, white offenders comprised 60% of all federal offenders, while Indigenous people comprised 23%, and Black and “other visible minority offenders” comprised 9% each of all federal offenders. Also during this same period, 2.9% of the Canadian population self‑identified as Black, 4.3% as Indigenous and 16.2% as members of another visible minority group.21
Bill C‑22 removes several mandatory minimum sentences of imprisonment for offences involving firearms and drugs. Indigenous and racialized offenders are overrepresented among those convicted of some drug‑ and firearms‑related offences. For example, with respect to drug offences, data from Correctional Service Canada compiled from 2007–2008 to 2016–2017 suggests that Black offenders were disproportionately admitted into correctional facilities during that period for violating section 6 of the CDSA on importing and exporting, which carries a mandatory minimum sentence that is removed by Bill C‑22. Black offenders made up 42% of these admissions in the 10 years studied, while self‑identified Black people accounted for only 2.9% of the Canadian population in that time period. Furthermore, the proportion of Indigenous people among offenders admitted into custody following a conviction under section 6 of the CDSA during the same period rose from 1% to 12.5%, while self‑identified Indigenous people made up only 4.3% of the population during that period.22
With respect to firearms offences, data from 2017 suggests that Black offenders were overrepresented among those convicted of various firearms offences that carry a mandatory minimum sentence. Many of the mandatory minimum sentences of imprisonment removed by Bill C‑22 – including those contained in sections 85, 99, 100, 244 and 344 of the Code – are for offences for which Black offenders are disproportionately convicted. Indigenous offenders are also overrepresented among those serving terms for a firearms offence that has an applicable mandatory minimum sentence of imprisonment. The proportion of Indigenous offenders in custody for firearms offences that carry mandatory minimum sentences of imprisonment rose from 17.5% in 2007–2008 to 40% in 2016–2017.23
Because these mandatory minimum sentences of imprisonment disproportionately affect Indigenous, Black and other racialized offenders, these sentences can be expected to exacerbate the problem of over‑incarceration among these populations.
Indigenous offenders are significantly overrepresented in Canadian correctional facilities. As of January 2020, Indigenous inmates comprised just over 30% of the adult population in federal correctional facilities even though Indigenous people comprise only 5% of the Canadian population.24 Indigenous women were even more significantly overrepresented, accounting for 42% of women inmates in federal correctional facilities as of January 2020.25 The number of Indigenous offenders has increased in the past decade.26 Indigenous offenders are also more likely to be held in custody than non‑Indigenous offenders are.27
Black people are also overrepresented in the federal criminal justice system, making up 7.2% of the federal offender population in 2018–2019,28 but only 3.5% of the Canadian population in 2016.29
In light of concerns about the overrepresented Indigenous and Black populations in the criminal justice system, Canadian courts have developed sentencing practices that aim to recognize the impacts of systemic racism and colonialism on Indigenous and Black offenders and promote sentencing without a term of imprisonment, where possible.
Section 718.2 of the Code lists sentencing principles to be considered by the judiciary when determining an appropriate sentence. Section 718.2(e) provides that:
- all available sanctions, other than imprisonment, that are reasonable in the circumstances … should be considered for all offenders, with particular attention to the circumstances of Aboriginal offenders.
In R. v. Gladue in 1999, the Supreme Court of Canada acknowledged the “serious problem of aboriginal overrepresentation in Canadian prisons”30 and interpreted section 718.2(e) of the Code to explicitly require sentencing judges to consider the particular circumstances of Indigenous offenders, including:
- The unique systemic or background factors which may have played a part in bringing the particular aboriginal offender before the courts; and
- The types of sentencing procedures and sanctions which may be appropriate in the circumstances for the offender because of his or her particular aboriginal heritage or connection.31
The use of Gladue reports, which detail these particular circumstances for the courts, has become an established means of informing sentencing decisions that involve Indigenous offenders. The Court, in Gladue, highlighted that:
the unique circumstances of aboriginal offenders is that community‑based sanctions coincide with the aboriginal concept of sentencing and the needs of aboriginal people and communities. … Where these sanctions are reasonable in the circumstances, they should be implemented.32
Some Canadian courts have also started taking into account the unique circumstances of Black offenders by using impact of race and culture assessments; these assessments provide information about the circumstances of Black offenders in light of the history of anti‑Black racism in Canada.33
For offences that carry a mandatory minimum sentence, judges do not have discretion to sentence Indigenous and Black offenders to community‑based sanctions, even if a Gladue report or an impact of race and culture assessment indicates that it would be appropriate to do so. However, in contrast to concerns about the disproportionate impact of mandatory minimum sentences on offenders from marginalized groups, some argue that such sentences may protect those in marginalized communities who may be overrepresented among victims of crime by ensuring appropriate sentences for offenders.34 Indigenous people, for example, have consistently been found to more frequently self‑report criminal victimization than non‑Indigenous people, suggesting they are disproportionately impacted as victims of crime.35
A conditional sentence is one where an offender is sentenced to a term of imprisonment of less than two years, to be served in the community subject to particular conditions,36 rather than in a correctional facility. Since offenders are often required to serve all or part of their conditional sentence in their home, these sentences are sometimes referred to as “house arrest.”37 Conditional sentences are intended to serve both punitive and rehabilitative aims.38 Section 742.1 of the Code sets out limitations39 on their application, allowing it only where:
Clause 14 of Bill C‑22 amends section 742.1 of the Code, lifting the prohibition on conditional sentences of imprisonment for offences that carry 10‑ or 14‑year maximum sentences in the situations described above, and for the specific offences previously listed as ineligible for conditional sentencing in section 742.1(f).
Consequently, Bill C‑22 makes conditional sentences applicable to a larger number of criminal offences. Furthermore, since Bill C‑22 removes some mandatory minimum sentences of imprisonment, persons convicted of these offences are no longer ineligible for conditional sentences.
Some of the limitations on conditional sentences that are removed by Bill C‑22 have been subject to constitutional challenges in the courts,40 including an ongoing legal challenge to be heard by the Supreme Court of Canada. In R. v. Sharma, the majority of the Ontario Court of Appeal held that sections 742.1(c) and 742.1(e)(ii) of the Code violated sections 7 and 15 of the Charter.41
Sharma involves a young Indigenous woman, Cheyenne Sharma, who pleaded guilty to the offence of importing cocaine contrary to section 6(1) of the CDSA and received a sentence of 17 months of imprisonment. At her sentencing hearing, Ms. Sharma challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum sentence of imprisonment in section 6(3)(a.1) of the CDSA, and the provision was struck down by the court as a violation of her section 12 Charter rights.42 She also challenged the constitutionality of sections 742.1(b), 742.1(c) and 742.1(e)(ii) of the Code, which limits the use of conditional sentences to situations in which:
- the offence is not an offence punishable by a minimum term of imprisonment;
- the offence is not an offence, prosecuted by way of indictment, for which the maximum term of imprisonment is 14 years or life;
…
- the offence is not an offence, prosecuted by way of indictment, for which the maximum term of imprisonment is 10 years, that
…
- involved the import, export, trafficking or production of drugs[.]
The defence argued that sections 742.1(b), 742.1(c) and 742.1(e)(ii) of the Code deprived Ms. Sharma of her right to liberty under section 7 of the Charter and her right to equality under section 15(1) of the Charter. The sentencing judge decided that sections 742.1(c) and 742.1(e)(ii) did not violate Ms. Sharma’s rights under sections 7 and 15.
The decision was appealed and the majority of the Ontario Court of Appeal held that sections 742.1(c) and 742.1(e)(ii) had a disproportionate and negative impact on the claimant as an Indigenous woman, given the over‑incarceration of Indigenous people in Canada and the remedial effect that conditional sentencing can have on over‑incarceration.43 It held that Ms. Sharma’s equality rights under section 15(1) of the Charter had been violated. It also held that the impugned sections violated her section 7 liberty rights, as the provisions were overly broad, and consequently, not consistent with the principles of fundamental justice. The infringements of Ms. Sharma’s section 7 and section 15 rights were held not to be consistent with section 1 of the Charter. The Ontario Court of Appeal consequently held that sections 742.1(c) and 742.1(e)(ii) were of no force and effect.
On 14 January 2021, the Supreme Court of Canada granted leave to appeal in this case, and consequently, the final determination as to the constitutionality of these limitations on conditional sentencing is pending.
Canada is experiencing an ongoing public health crisis of opioid overdoses and deaths.44 Opioids are medications that can help to relieve pain; they include drugs such as fentanyl, morphine, oxycodone and hydromorphone. Pharmaceutical opioids are manufactured by a pharmaceutical company and approved for medical use in humans. These drugs are legal when used as prescribed by a health professional to treat pain. Opioids are considered illegal when they have been made, shared or sold illegally. Examples include opioids used by someone other than the person to whom the drugs were prescribed and opioids obtained from someone other than a registered practitioner.45
Opioid use is considered problematic when it has harmful effects on a person’s health and life or when it involves illegal opioids. Problematic use can become a substance use disorder or addiction when it involves regular use despite continued negative consequences.46
Opioid‑ and other drug‑related overdose deaths have increased dramatically in recent years.47 Factors that contribute to the crisis include a high incidence of opioid prescribing, the emergence of dangerously potent synthetic opioids like fentanyl and carfentanil in the illegal drug supply, and the impossibility of knowing, without equipment, the quantity of such opioids that has been mixed into illegal drugs.48
Between January 2016 and December 2020, approximately 21,174 apparent opioid‑toxicity deaths occurred in Canada, and from January to December 2020, there were nearly 17 deaths per day.49 The 1,766 deaths that occurred between October and December 2020 represent the highest quarterly total recorded since national surveillance began in 2016 – an increase of 100% over the same period in 2019.50
The COVID‑19 pandemic has further worsened this crisis, with fatal and non‑fatal opioid‑overdose levels reaching historic highs.51 The closure of the Canada–United States border has disrupted drug‑supply chains and has led to the increased toxicity of the illegal supply. Social‑distancing guidelines, self‑isolation measures, the increased use of substances as a means of coping with stress and reduced access to supports and services have contributed to these historic rates. In particular, social‑distancing and self‑isolation measures have created situations in which people have died from overdoses alone in their own homes.52
Increases in fatal overdoses have been observed throughout the country, although western Canada remains the most affected region.53 For instance, the British Columbia Coroners Service reported 159 suspected illicit drug toxicity deaths in June 2021, the second highest number of such deaths it had ever recorded in the month of June. This number represents about 5.3 deaths per day. The data also revealed an increase in the number of deaths involving extreme concentrations of fentanyl.54
The drug overdose crisis in Canada disproportionately affects Indigenous peoples.55 Recent figures from British Columbia, for example, showed that between January and May 2020, 16% of all overdose deaths in that province were of people from First Nations, who represent only 3.3% of the province’s population. In that same time period, the rate of death among people from First Nations was 5.6 times higher than among other British Columbians. In particular, the number of women from First Nations who died of overdose is 8.7 times higher than for other women in that province in 2019.56
Moreover, many people dealing with opioid‑related harms also experience other mental disorders.57 Factors frequently noted among those who have died of opioid‑ and other drug‑related overdoses include: a history of mental health concerns, trauma and stigma; a lack of available help at the time of the overdose; a lack of social support; and a lack of comprehensive, coordinated health care and social service follow‑ups.58 In particular, stigma around substance use is a barrier to obtaining help, health care and social services.59
In 2012, Statistics Canada’s Canadian Community Health Survey60 showed that Canadians with a mental or substance use disorder were more likely to be arrested than those without a disorder, and they were more likely to come into contact with police for problems with their emotions, mental health or substance use.61 A report emerging from that survey concluded that “[t]he presence of a mental or substance use disorder was associated with increased odds of coming into contact with police, even after controlling for related demographic and socioeconomic factors.”62
The CDSA regulates certain drugs and associated substances, as listed in the Schedules of that Act. Schedule I lists drugs such as opioids, cocaine and methamphetamine. Schedule II covers synthetic cannabinoids, and Schedule III includes lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD), psilocybin and mescaline.
The Narcotic Control Regulations63 (NCR), made under the CDSA, regulate certain narcotics, including oxycodone, opium, codeine and morphine. The NCR outline the circumstances in which activities like possessing those narcotics are permitted.64 Otherwise, where not authorized under the NCR, simple possession of an substance included in Schedule I, II or III is considered an offence under section 4(1) of the CDSA.65 The punishment for the offence of simple possession under that provision depends on the schedule in which the relevant substance is classified. In the case of a Schedule I substance, an offence under section 4(1) can lead to a term of imprisonment not exceeding seven years.66
The federal government’s Canadian drugs and substances strategy is meant to be a “collaborative, compassionate and evidence‑based approach to drug policy.”67 It focuses on harm reduction, prevention, treatment and enforcement, among other objectives.
In its legislative responses to the opioid crisis, the federal government has implemented a number of changes. For instance, it has introduced legislation that amends the CDSA to simplify the application process for supervised consumption sites68 and to change offences and penalties for opioid use.69 In 2017, Parliament adopted the Good Samaritan Drug Overdose Act,70 which seeks to encourage Canadians to get help during an overdose and save lives. For people who experience or witness an overdose, this Act may protect them from charges for possession under section 4(1) of the CDSA and for breaches of conditions relating to simple possession of controlled substances.71 The NCR have also been amended to facilitate the prescription of methadone, an opioid substitution treatment.72
Moreover, on 17 August 2020, the Director of Public Prosecutions issued a guideline to prosecutors on the approach to take with simple possession cases under section 4(1) of the CDSA. Prosecutors are generally to pursue a criminal prosecution only in the most serious cases that raise public safety concerns. Otherwise, they are to pursue alternative measures, such as Indigenous restorative justice, and divert cases away from the criminal justice system. In this sense, “diversion” refers to the approach used to address the conduct of an alleged offender through measures outside of the traditional court process.73 Notably, prosecutors are to consider alternatives to prosecution where the possession relates to a substance use disorder and the alleged offender is “enrolled in a drug treatment court program or a course of treatment provided under the supervision of a health professional, including those involving Indigenous culture‑based programming.”74 The guideline recognizes that “substance use has a significant health component” and that criminal sanctions are of an limited effectiveness as deterrents or “as a means of addressing the public safety concerns when considering the harmful effects of criminal records and short periods of incarceration.”75
Bill C‑22 contains 21 clauses. Key clauses are discussed in the following section.
Clauses 1 to 8 and 10 to 13 make changes to the Code to remove mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment previously provided for several indictable offences involving firearms or other weapons. The changes made do not change the prescribed maximum sentence for any offences, nor do they impact the designation of an offence as indictable, summary or hybrid.
Clause 2 amends section 85(3) of the Code to remove mandatory minimum sentences of one year (or three years in the case of reoffending) for offenders convicted of using a firearm in the commission of an offence (section 85(1)) or of using an imitation firearm in the commission of an offence (section 85(2)). These offences apply to persons who use a firearm or imitation firearm in the commission or attempted commission of specific indictable offences, or during flight following the commission of such offences.76
Clause 3 amends section 92(3) of the Code to remove mandatory minimum sentences of one year (for a second offence) and two years less a day (for a third or subsequent offence) for offenders convicted of possessing a firearm knowing its possession is unauthorized (section 92(1)) or possessing a prohibited weapon, device or ammunition knowing its possession is unauthorized (section 92(2)).
Clause 4 amends section 95(2)(a) of the Code to remove the mandatory minimum sentences of three years for an first offence and five years for a second or subsequent offence for offenders convicted of possessing a prohibited or restricted firearm with ammunition (section 95(1)), where the Crown elects to proceed by indictment.77 The mandatory minimum sentences of imprisonment removed through this amendment have previously been held to be unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of Canada and are consequently of no force and effect throughout the country.78
Clause 5 amends section 96(2)(a) of the Code to remove the mandatory minimum sentence of imprisonment of one year for offenders convicted of possessing a weapon obtained by the commission of an offence, where the Crown elects to proceed by indictment. Although the mandatory minimum sentence of imprisonment removed through this amendment has previously been held to be unconstitutional by some Canadian courts, it has also been upheld following constitutional challenges by others.79
Clause 6 amends section 99(3) of the Code to remove the mandatory minimum sentence of imprisonment of one year for offenders convicted of weapons trafficking (section 99(1)), except where the object in question is a prohibited firearm, a restricted firearm, a non‑restricted firearm, a prohibited device, any ammunition or prohibited ammunition.80 The mandatory minimum sentence of imprisonment removed by this amendment has previously been held to be unconstitutional by a Canadian court of appeal.81
Clause 7 amends section 100(3) of the Code to remove the mandatory minimum sentence of imprisonment of one year for offenders convicted of possession for the purpose of weapons trafficking (section 100(1)), where the object in question is not a prohibited firearm, restricted firearm, non‑restricted firearm, prohibited device, any ammunition or any prohibited ammunition.82 The mandatory minimum sentence of imprisonment removed through this amendment has previously been held to be unconstitutional by some Canadian courts of appeal.83
Clause 8 amends section 103(2.1) of the Code to remove the mandatory minimum sentence of imprisonment of one year for offenders convicted of importing or exporting knowing the object is unauthorized (section 103(1)), where the object in question is not a prohibited firearm, restricted firearm, non‑restricted firearm, prohibited device or any prohibited ammunition.84
Clause 10 amends section 244(2)(b) of the Code to remove the mandatory minimum sentence of imprisonment of four years for offenders convicted of discharging a firearm with intent (section 244(1)), where the offence does not involve the use of an restricted or prohibited firearm and is not committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal organization.85 The mandatory minimum sentence removed by this amendment has previously been subject to unsuccessful constitutional challenges in some Canadian courts.86
Clause 11 amends section 244.2(3)(b) of the Code to remove the mandatory minimum sentence of imprisonment of four years for offenders convicted of discharging a firearm recklessly (section 244.2(1)), where the offence does not involve the use of a restricted or prohibited firearm and is not committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal organization.87 The mandatory minimum sentence of imprisonment removed through this amendment has previously been the subject of both successful and unsuccessful constitutional challenges in some Canadian courts.88
Clause 12 repeals section 344(1)(a.1) of the Code to remove the mandatory minimum sentence of imprisonment of four years for offenders convicted of robbery, where the offence is committed with a firearm that is not restricted or prohibited, and where the offence is not committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal organization.89 The mandatory minimum sentence of imprisonment removed through this amendment has previously been the subject of both successful and unsuccessful constitutional challenges in some Canadian courts, including courts of appeal.90
Clause 13 repeals section 346(1.1)(a.1) to remove the mandatory minimum sentence of imprisonment of four years for offenders convicted of extortion (section 346(1)), where a firearm that is not prohibited or restricted was used in the commission of the offence, and the offence was not committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with a criminal organization.91
Bill C‑22 also amends the Code to expand the availability of conditional sentences for an wider range of criminal offences.
Existing section 742.1(c) of the Code prohibits the use of a conditional sentence for an offence prosecuted by way of indictment for which the maximum term of imprisonment is 14 years. Clause 14(1) amends this section to lift the prohibition against using a conditional sentence for offences that carry a maximum term of 14 years, and replaces it with a prohibition against using a conditional sentence for three serious offences:
Clause 14(2) repeals sections 742.1(e) and 742.1(f), removing two further limitations on the availability of conditional sentences. The first limitation removed by this clause precludes the use of a conditional sentence for offences prosecuted by indictment where the maximum term is 10 years of imprisonment and the offence: resulted in bodily harm; involved the import, export, trafficking or production of drugs; or involved the use of a weapon. The second limitation removed by this clause precludes conditional sentencing for the following offences, if prosecuted by indictment:
By removing some limitations on the use of conditional sentences contained in current sections 742.1(c), 742.1(e) and 742.1(f) of the Code, clause 14 expands the availability of conditional sentencing. While these amendments mean that conditional sentences are now available as potential sentences for several serious offences, such sentences continue to be prohibited in some circumstances: where a term of imprisonment longer than two years less a day is imposed (section 742.1); where the offence for which the offender was convicted carries a minimum mandatory sentence of imprisonment (section 742.1(b)); or where the offence committed is a terrorism or organized crime offence that carries a maximum sentence of imprisonment of 10 years or more and is prosecuted by indictment (section 742.1(d)). Furthermore, section 742.1(a) precludes a conditional sentence if such a sentence can “endanger the safety of the community,” limiting the applicability of conditional sentences for some violent offenders.
An appellate level constitutional challenge has succeeded in Ontario, and leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was granted.93 Consequently some of the sections of the Code removed by clause 14 may be declared unconstitutional and of no force and effect by the Supreme Court.
Bill C‑22 amends the Code and the CDSA to remove some mandatory minimum sentences for offences pertaining to drugs and substances. This bill removes all mandatory minimum sentences of imprisonment from the CDSA. The changes made do not change the prescribed maximum sentence for any offence, nor do they impact the designation of an offence as an indictable, summary or hybrid offence.
Clause 9 amends section 121.1(4)(a) and repeals section 121.1(5) of the Code to remove mandatory minimum sentences of imprisonment for the offence of selling tobacco products and raw leaf tobacco, not packaged or stamped.
Clause 15 amends section 5(3)(a) of the CDSA to remove the mandatory minimum sentences of imprisonment for the offences of trafficking in substance (section 5(1)) and possession for the purpose of trafficking (section 5(2)). Some of the mandatory minimum sentences of imprisonment removed by this amendment have previously been held to be unconstitutional and struck down by Canadian courts.94
Clause 16 amends section 6(3)(a) and repeals section 6(3)(a.1) of the CDSA to remove mandatory minimum sentences of imprisonment for the offences of importing and exporting a substance (section 6(1)) and possession of a substance for the purpose of exporting (section 6(2)), where the substance in question is listed in Schedule I or II. Some of the mandatory minimum sentences of imprisonment removed through these changes have previously been held to be unconstitutional and struck down by Canadian courts.95
Clause 17 amends section 7(2)(a) and repeals sections 7(2)(a.1) and 7(3) of the CDSA to remove mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment for the offence of production of a substance (section 7(1)).
Clause 20 of Bill C‑22 seeks to address the opioid crisis by supporting a public health approach to simple drug possession.96 The same clause adds a new Part I.1 to the CDSA after section 10 on sentencing. This new part introduces evidence‑based diversion measures and opens with a new provision, section 10.1, which declares a set of principles. The principles are meant to guide the interpretation of the remaining provisions in Part I.1 and lay out the government’s public health approach to problematic substance use, recognizing that:
Against the backdrop of these principles, the remaining provisions introduced by clause 20 describe the diversion measures that peace officers and prosecutors must consider.
Under new sections 10.2, 10.4 and 10.5, instead of laying charges against a person in cases of simple possession, a peace officer must consider doing nothing, issuing a warning, or with the person’s consent, referring the person to a treatment program. In determining which measure to take, officers must keep in mind the principles set out in section 10.1. However, an officer’s failure to consider those alternative measures does not invalidate any charges that may be laid. Although an officer’s police force may keep records of warnings or referrals made, information about a warning, referral, officer’s decision to take no further action and the offence itself may not be entered as evidence in court of a person’s past offending behaviour.
New section 10.3 establishes directives for prosecutors that are consistent with the guideline issued by the Director of Public Prosecutions. A prosecutor initiates or continues a prosecution for simple possession under section 4(1) of the CDSA only if, after considering the principles set out in section 10.1 of that Act, the prosecutor is of the view that the use of a warning or a referral under section 10.2, or the use of other alternative measures as defined in section 716 of the Code is not appropriate, and that in the circumstances, prosecution is appropriate. Under section 716 of the Code, “alternative measures means measures other than judicial proceedings under this Act used to deal with a person who is eighteen years of age or over and alleged to have committed an offence.”
Clause 21 contains coordinating amendments with respect to Bill C‑21, An Act to amend certain Acts and to make certain consequential amendments (firearms).97 The coordinating amendments provided in clause 21 of Bill C‑22 address the timing of the coming into force of bills C‑21 and C‑22, since both make amendments to sections 95, 99, 100 and 103 of the Code.
The principles a judge is to take into account when sentencing an offender are listed at section 718 of the Criminal Code. Aggravating and mitigating circumstances are characteristics of a case that inform a judicial interpretation of the seriousness of the offence and the offender’s level of responsibility. Aggravating circumstances suggest a greater seriousness and more responsibility, whereas mitigating circumstances suggest relatively lesser seriousness and less responsibility. For a non‑exhaustive list of aggravating circumstances, see Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C‑46, s. 718.2.
[ Return to text ]Note that while the most common argument in constitutional challenges of the mandatory minimum is that this minimum violates section 12 of the Charter, some challenges have alleged violations of sections 7 and 15 of the Charter.
[ Return to text ]For more information about the approach used to determine whether a mandatory minimum sentence violates section 12 of the Charter, see Charlie Feldman, “Mandatory Minimum Sentences and Section 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,” HillNotes, Library of Parliament, 28 April 2015.
[ Return to text ]For more information about sentencing and Indigenous offenders, see Graeme McConnell, Indigenous People and Sentencing in Canada, Publication no. 2020‑46‑E, Library of Parliament, 22 May 2020.
Note: While Gladue reports are intended to address the over‑incarceration of the Indigenous population, some evidence suggests that this strategy has not been particularly effective and Gladue reports are not universally accessible across Canada. For a discussion about some concerns with the application of Gladue, see Department of Justice Canada, Spotlight on Gladue: Challenges, Experiences, and Possibilities in Canada’s Criminal Justice System (533 KB, 59 pages), September 2017.
For additional information about Impact of Race and Culture Assessments, see Maria C. Dugas, “Committing to Justice: The Case for Impact of Race and Culture Assessments in Sentencing African Canadian Offenders (828 KB, 57 pages),” Dalhousie Law Journal, Vol. 43, No. 1, 2020.
Although section 85(3)(a) has been the subject of constitutional challenges, it has been upheld by the courts in several cases. For examples of appellate decisions that uphold the constitutionality of section 85(3)(a), see R. v. Stephenson, 2019 ABCA 453 (CanLII); R. v. Superales, 2019 ONCA 792 (CanLII); and R. v. Al‑Isawi, 2017 BCCA 163 (CanLII).
[ Return to text ]For examples of an unsuccessful constitutional challenge of section 96(2)(a), see R. v. Chislett, 2016 CanLII 85360 (ON SC); R. v. Bressette, 2010 ONSC 3831; and R. v. Carranza, [2004] O.J. No. 6041 (SCJ).
[ Return to text ]For examples of an unsuccessful constitutional challenge of section 244.2(3)(b), see R. v. Hills, 2020 ABCA 263 (CanLII); R. v. Ookowt, 2020 NUCA 5 (CanLII); R. v. Itturiligaq, 2020 NUCA 6 (CanLII); R. v. Oud, 2016 BCCA 332 (CanLII); and R. v. Crockwell, 2013 CanLII 8675 (NL SC).
[ Return to text ]For examples of an unsuccessful constitutional challenge, see R. v. Bernarde, 2018 NWTCA 7 (CanLII); R. v. Hailemolokot et al., 2013 MBQB 285 (CanLII); R. c. Perron, 2016 QCCQ 13089 (CanLII); and Caron c. R., 2014 QCCQ 10603 (CanLII).
[ Return to text ]For examples of a lower court decision in which the mandatory minimum sentence of imprisonment for the offences of trafficking of a substance and of possession for the purpose of trafficking is struck down, see R. v. Jackson‑Bullshields, 2015 BCPC 411 (CanLII); R. v. Jackson‑Bullshields, 2015 BCPC 414 (CanLII) (section 5(3)(a)(i)(C) declared of no force and effect); and R. v. Robinson, 2016 ONSC 2819 (CanLII) (section 5(3)(a)(ii)(A) held to violate section 12 of the Charter, no decision on section 1).
However, in contrast, section 5(3)(a)(ii)(B) has faced constitutional challenges and been upheld in lower courts. See R. v. Carswell, 2018 SKQB 53 (CanLII); and R. v. Boutcher, 2017 NLTD(G) 111, 2017 CarswellNfld 265.
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